7 Myths about Serial Killers

In 2005 the FBI published a guide to serial murder for investigators which listed seven myths or misconceptions about serial killers. Their examples were all cases from the United States – so we decided to try and match the myths with cases from London’s own history of murder.

1) Myth: Serial killers are all dysfunctional loners.

Many serial killers hide in plain sight within their communities. Serial murderers often have families and homes, are gainfully employed, and appear to be normal members of the community.

FBI

Although George Joseph Smith did not have a regular job he was far from a loner – he actively sought out women to seduce, marry and then steal from. At least seven women fell prey to his charms. Three of them were murdered.

2) Myth: Serial killers are all white males.

Contrary to popular belief, serial killers span all racial groups.

FBI

3) Myth: Serial killers are only motivated by sex.

All serial murders are not sexually-based. There are many other motivations for serial murders including anger, thrill, financial gain, and attention seeking.

FBI
Peter Bryan

Peter Bryan busts both these myths. He was born in London but his parents were immigrants from Barbados. And by the time he was arrested for his second murder he had developed an appetite not for sex, but for human flesh.

4) Myth: All serial murderers travel.

Most serial killers have very defined geographic areas of operation. They conduct their killings within comfort zones that are often defined by an anchor point (e.g. place of residence, employment, or residence of a relative). Serial murderers will, at times, spiral their activities outside of their comfort zone, when their confidence has grown through experience or to avoid detection.

FBI
John Reginald Christie

Although a number of London murderers have carried out their crimes across the country (see the case of George Joseph Smith above), one of the most famous examples is John Reginald Christie, who killed at least six women at his home in Rillington Place in Notting Hill. See also Dennis Nilsen, who killed at least 15 teenage boys and men at his homes in Cricklewood and Notting Hill.

5) Myth: Serial killers cannot stop killing.

It has been widely believed that once serial killers start killing, they cannot stop. There are, however, some serial killers who stop murdering altogether before being caught. In these instances, there are events or circumstances in offenders’ lives that inhibit them from pursuing more victims. These can include increased participation in family activities, sexual substitution, and other diversions.

FBI

The world’s most famous serial killer operated in a very small area of east London and was never caught – ‘Jack the Ripper’. The killings ceased in November 1888, three months after they began. Did ‘Jack’ die or leave the country, or did he simply just stop killing?

6) Myth: All Serial killers are insane or are evil geniuses.

The media has created a number of fictional serial killer “geniuses”, who outsmart law enforcement at every turn. Like other populations, however, serial killers range in intelligence from borderline to above average levels.

FBI

The ‘Finchley baby farmers’ Amelia Sach and Annie Walters were neither intelligent nor insane but are thought to have murdered dozens of babies in the early years of the 20th Century.

7) Myth: Serial killers want to get caught.

While most serial killers plan their offenses more thoroughly than other criminals, the learning curve is still very steep. They must select, target, approach, control, and dispose of their victims. As serial killers continue to offend without being captured, they can become empowered, feeling they will never be identified. It is not that serial killers want to get caught; they feel that they can’t get caught.

FBI

If serial killers really wanted to be caught then surely we would know the identity of the killer the media dubbed ‘Jack the Stripper‘. Between 1964 and 1965 at least six women were killed and their nude bodies left around London or dumped in the River Thames.

Sanction Detection Rates

The ‘murder rate’ is one way of measuring the effectiveness of the justice system. Another is the percentage of homicides that are ‘cleared up’ – otherwise known as the Sanction Detection Rate.

This means cases where a suspect has been identified but not necessarily convicted of the crime, perhaps because they have been acquitted on the grounds of self defence. A small number of cases are classed as unresolved, such as the murder of Jill Dando (the suspect was first convicted then acquitted several years later following a retrial).

According to the official definition: ‘A sanctioned detection occurs when (1) a notifiable offence (crime) has been committed and recorded; (2) a suspect has been identified and is aware of the detection; (3) the CPS evidential test is satisfied; (4) the victim has been informed that the offence has been detected, and; (5) the suspect has been charged, reported for summons, or cautioned, been issued With a penalty notice for disorder or the offence has been taken into consideration when an offender is sentenced.’

The Metropolitan Police’s list of homicides for January 2006 to September 2011 (issued in September 2011) revealed that 85.2 per cent of the homicides listed had been ‘detected’. Most are sanction detections but there are a few other detections where the suspect committed suicide after carrying out the killing. This figure can potentially change over time as suspects are charged and put on trial.

Another release under the Freedom of information act breaks down the number of sanction detections made every financial year between 2007/08 and 2010/11.

The Sanction Detection Rate (SDR) is therefore 83 per cent for 2007/08, rising to a consistent 93 to 94 per cent for the following three years.

This is a different kind of measurement because it includes detections of cases that took place in earlier years, and therefore the ‘closure rate’ could potentially be higher than 100 per cent. This sounds absurd (See the debate around the announcement that Washington DC had a 94 per cent closure rate for homicide), but it does give an indication of the effectiveness of homicide investigations. The SDR also does not change over time.

Looking at the UK as a whole, the last set of Home Office statistics gave a sanction detection rate of 86 per cent for 2009/2010 and 83 per cent for 2010/11 (the number of homicides rose from 618 to 642, with the number of sanction detections made over the same period falling from 533 to 530).

Perhaps of more interest is the comparison between the sanction detection rates for homicide and other offences including domestic crime, robbery, burglary, sexual offences, gun crime and knife crime.

Homicide has long been prioritised by the police and the justice system, for obvious reasons. It is investigated centrally by a separate ‘Homicide and Serious Crime Command’ rather than by detectives in the respective borough, and can devote large amounts of manpower and money to analysing CCTV footage, mobile phone data and forensic examination.  There are also far fewer cases to concentrate on compared to other offences – for example in 2009/10, the figures show 117 homicides compared to 51,682 domestic offences, 9,930 sexual offences, 33,479 robberies, 92,807 burglaries, 3,460 offences of gun crime and 12,617 of knife crime.

Clearly, it’s a lot harder to get away with murder.

Suspicious and Unexplained Deaths

The case of MI6 spy Gareth Williams is one of those rare mysteries that seems to defy all logic. It begins with a body, but it is a body within a locked bag within a locked room. Detectives and scientists have marshaled all their resources in an attempt to work out how it happened yet at the end of it we do not even know the cause of death.

Up until the inquest into Gareth Williams’ death was not classed as a homicide for the reason that the police could not even be sure anyone else was involved. It was instead classed as ‘suspicious and unexplained’ (although the case was investigated by the ‘Homicide and Serious Crime Command’, often referred to as the ‘murder squad’).

So how many suspicious and unexplained deaths do the murder squad deal with each year? We put in a Freedom of Information request covering the last five years, and this is what came back:

Financial YearTotal S/U DeathsRemains S/UReclassified as Homicide
2011/1216160
2010/1120112
2009/1028223
2008/0920105
2007/0831166

The ‘total s/u deaths’ is the number of suspicious / unexplained deaths referred to the Homicide and Serious Crime Command during that year.

This shows that the Gareth Williams case was just one of 20 suspicious / unexplained deaths in the financial year 2010-2011. It is one of 11 such cases that remain classed as suspicious / unexplained.

Cases are more likely to reclassified as time goes by, which explains the increase in the final column. It is also reassuring to know that the decrease in the number of homicides over the last ten years isn’t explained by an increase in cases classed as suspicious / unexplained.

On the other hand, the families of those whose cases remain unexplained must find it incredibly frustrating not knowing exactly what happened. It is only in rare cases like that of Gareth Williams that they are brought under the media spotlight.

Interior Flat no. 6
Photos released by police during the investigation into the death of Gareth Williams

Off the Map: The case of Jayden Wray

This week it was reported that the parents of Jayden Wray had been cleared by the High Court of all responsibility for the death of their son.

As a result we have decided to remove the case from the map as it can no longer be said to be a homicide. Although experts disagreed about the cause of death, it is now thought that Rickets was responsible for the injuries.

Jayden Wray
Jayden Wray

This is how the case appeared before it was deleted:

Four month-old Jayden Wray died after suffering serious head injuries and fractures to his arm, leg and hands.

He was taken to hospital on July 22, 2009, after falling ill at the family home on the Barnsbury Estate in Islington, north London.

The boy died three days later at Great Ormond Street hospital.

His mother Chana Al-Alas, 18, and father Rohan Wray, 20, were initially charged with grievous bodily harm and released on police bail.

Following further medical reports, on August 3, 2010, they were charged with murder and causing or allowing the death of a child.

They went on trial at the Old Bailey on November 1, 2011. The prosecution claimed that Jayden died of brain damage after being shaken by his parents. The boy also suffered from Rickets, a softening of bones caused by vitamin D deficiency.

On December 9, 2011, both parents were cleared of all charges on the direction of the judge Stephen Kramer QC.

He said he had made his decision because the expert evidence about the cause of death was contradictory.

Judge Kramer added: “The evidence is that the parents were acting properly and gave no cause at all for concern over their care for Jayden.”

murdermap case summary

Links:

Parents cleared over Jayden Wray death of rickets – BBC

Couple cleared of killing son call for inquiry – Telegraph

Baby Jayden case renews concerns over rickets and child abuse allegations – Guardian

Parents of Jayden Wray reunited with second child after winning battle against Islington Council – Islington Gazette

The London Homicide Manual

How do detectives investigate a murder? Books, TV programmes and documentaries give us some idea – even if their focus is on a single grizzled cop who solves a homicide single-handed. But what exactly is the ‘procedure’ when that call first comes in about a dead body?

As it happens the Metropolitan Police have what is called the ‘London Homicide Manual Specific Operating Procedure’, described as ‘the premier instruction document on the investigation of homicide and unexplained death.’

What does it contain? The answer is we don’t know. Last month the Met agreed to release the document following a request under the Freedom of Information Act – but only after the majority of it was redacted under Section 31(1)(a)(b) on the grounds it was not in the public interest.

In their response, the Met admitted there was an argument for full disclosure:

Better awareness of the MPS and its procedures may reduce crime or lead to more information from the public.

This information could be a useful deterrent to those with criminal intent, as the abilities and capabilities of the MPS who are charged with enforcing the law by preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve will be apparent.  There is also a public interest in the transparency of policing operations.

Disclosure could provide the public with an understanding that public funds are being used appropriately.

But the Met also saw powerful reasons for withholding information about how they investigate homicide:

Release would have the serious effect of compromising law enforcement tactics and would also hinder the prevention and detection of crime.

In addition the release of any information that is directly concerned with the investigation of crime would prejudice investigations and any possible future proceedings.

Disclosure would technically be releasing very sensitive operational information into the public domain, which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to use the information contained in this document to map strategies to counter the techniques used by the MPS to investigate homicides.

Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would be directly affected as this information can be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate without fear of prejudice in those areas.

Metropolitan Police

The Met do have a point – it isn’t a good idea to give criminals information that helps them to get away with murder. To make an analogy (perhaps inappropriately), no football manager would publish his tactics ahead of a match.

Whether or not entire chapters had to be redacted is hard to tell. All we have is the titles – Responsibility for Investigation, Initial Response, Specialist Crime Directorate Response, Policy Guidance and Good Practice, Record Keeping, Murder Review, Use of HOLMES [Home Office Large Major Enquiry System] within the Major Incident Room.

What remains is the introduction and the first chapter dealing with the relevant homicide legislation.

This level of redaction appears to contrast with the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual from 2006 and the ‘Territorial Policing SOP: Minimum Standards for the Primary Investigation of Crime’, which has already been released under the Freedom of Information Act (pdf available via What Do They Know).

Should the manual have been released in full or is that taking ‘Open Justice’ too far?